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By 1925 the Australian Labour Party had held power in Queensland 
continuously for ten years. The dominant faction within the Party 
was the Australian Workers' Union [AWU] which had achieved its level 
of influence through organisation, discipline and the skilful - at 
times ruthless - use of strikes. Now however it was committed to 
the pursuit of its alms through the arbitration system. A rival 
within the ALP, and within the labour movement broadly, was the 
Australian Railways' Union [ARU] committed to direct Industrial action 
to achieve its alms: the key importance of rail transport in Queens-
land, at a time when long-distance road transport was insignificant, 
gave the ARU a position of apparent strategic strength. In the 
latter part of 1925, following a dramatically successful use of strike 
action over basic wage cuts, the ARU. flushed with success, was 
eager to seize every opportunity to demonstrate its Industrial muscle 
and to assert its hold over the Labor government. Not only had the 
railway unions been successful in by-passing the Arbitration Court 
and winning their demands, but they had driven from office the 
vacillating premier. William Gillies. However if the militants 
believed that their influence could be extended to the Labor party 
machine, they were misguided if not naive. Their success in 1925 
was attributable to a rare harmony attained between unions over an 
issue of wage justice. The AWU and the moderate craft unions could 
not be expected to relinquish power to the militants Indefinitely, 
and at the first sign of further direct action would dissociate their 
members. In the meantime Gillies' successor. William McCormack, 
sounded an ominous warning to the railway unions with a promise to 
resist militant pressures. 
ARU leaders were well aware that with the election of McCormack to 
the premiership they would have a tough fight on their hands in any 
future resort to strike action. When it came to industrial and union 
Issues, McCormack was probably the most experienced strategist in the 
Labour movement. He had been the driving force in the old Amalgamated 
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Workers' Association, the mastermind of the 1911 sugar strike and the 
brains behind the amalgamation movement which created the AWU in 
1913. Now a champion of arbitration, McCormack told the militants 
that he would resist any challenge to his Government's authority, and 
would not tolerate disruptive tactics by union leaders which might 
effect the State's financial well-being. Clearly his warning was 
intended for the ARU "bosses" whom he saw as threatening to the 
AWU and more moderate unions within the Labour movement. No doubt 
the praise heaped on him by the conservative press for his outspoken-
ness made him determined to stand by his pledge to deal firmly with 
the militant unions. It was not long however before McCormack's 
words were put to the test in what was to prove a watershed in the 
struggle between militant unionists and the state Labor administration. 
The scene for a showdown was the port of Bowen which in 1925 ranked 
sixth in the value of exports from Queensland. Bowen was the outlet 
for primary products, in particular sugar from the Proserpine and 
Inkerman mills and beef from the Merlnda meatworks. Whereas most 
visitors to Bowen over recent decades have considered It a sleepy 
hollow, it was a different case between the wars. With strong 
contingents of wharf labourers, railwayman and meatworkers, Bowen had 
a reputation as a seedbed of militant unionism. It was probably 
appropriate that the first shots of the struggle between the new 
premier, McCormack, and the supremely confident ARU under the guidance 
of George Rymer, over who should dictate labour policy, were fired in 
Bowen in what would become known as the Port Hardy dispute. 
Throughout the winter of 1925 a strike by British seamen 
disaffected shipping in Australian ports. When members of the 
British union appealed to Australian unions for support, a controlling 
committee - the Overseas Transport Union Strike Committee - was 
formed in Brisbane, with George Rymer as its president and representatives 
from the Seamens' Union, Waterside Workers, Coal Workers and ARU. 
Branch committees were set up in Townsville. Cairns, Gladstone and 
Bowen, and Rymer's central strike committee subsequently placed a black 
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ban on the supply of coal to all strike-bound British ships; they 
exempted coal necessary for refrigeration purposes. 
Coinciding with this dispute was a separate strike which started 
in Cairns in September 1925 when members of the Waterside Workers' 
2 
Federation walked off the job, demanding a rotary system of labour. 
This strike quickly spread throughout northern ports at the height 
of the sugar crushing and meat killing season. Farmers, angry at 
the Inconvenience caused by the waterfront troubles, attempted to 
load vessels tied up at the strike-bound ports, but were dispersed by 
police. 
Both disputes extended to Bowen in the latter part of October 1925 
when seamen refused to coal the vessel Port Hardy, and Waterside 
Workers' Federation members decided by a nearly two to one majority, 
3 
not to resume work unless the rotary system was introduced. When a 
secret ballot ordered by the Arbitration Court, was arranged for 
23 October, none of the 'wharfles' presented themselves to vote. Their 
action understandably alarmed many farmers. While the Port Hardy was 
primarily held in port by the British Seamens strike, farmers were 
clearly worried over the effect of the waterside workers strike on 
the export of their produce. According to one report, "the feeling 
was rampant throughout the town that the farmers were coming to 
Bowen to work the Port Hardy." 
Cane farmers in the district had cause to be angry. After years 
of battling with dry seasons, the completion of a State Government 
scheme of Irrigation had resulted in a bumper crop in 1925. However. 
if the dispute continued, approximately half of the cane could not be 
harvested. Already mill storage was full and there were several 
thousand tons of sugar at Bowen awaiting shipment. The North Queensland 
Register reported: 
The position is a disastrous one for all branches of the 
sugar industry in the Home Hill district. Their only 
port is Bowen and it is blockaded as effectively as if 
an enemy ship were anchored in Port Denison. Already 
the losses of the canegrowers have been enormous, and 
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pretty well a couple of hundred thousand pounds worth of 
cane remain to be harvested. Unless the farmers can obtain 
shipment for their sugar, the majority of them will be 
ruined.5 
Telegrams to the Premier requested that a vessel be sent to remove the 
stockpiled sugar from Bowen. Unless something was done immediately, 
the farmers argued, the mill would cease crushing and the sugar season 
would close prematurely. 
McCormack deemed the request "impractical" at that stage of the 
dispute; however the Sugar Board ordered the chartering of several 
vessels in an endeavour to ease the situation. One attempt to coal 
the Port Hardy by the John Burke Ltd. steamer Palmer failed when 
'black' bans Imposed by the Queensland branch of the Seamens' Union on 
all ships of that line resulted in the Palmer returning to the wharf 
and discharging her coal. However other ships, including the steamer 
Port Curtis and the collier Corrimal, which had also been declared 
'black' anchored in the Whitsunday passage awaiting further Instructions. 
The Transport Strike Committee, formed to coordinate the strike, sub-
mitted a resolution to the ARU declaring "all cargo to and from, and 
also the Port Hardy itself 'black' and requested that railwaymen refrain 
Q 
from handling same". A combined meeting of railwaymen on 29 October 
endorsed the resolution, and the ARU, undoubtedly testing the 
Government's mettle, came out in support of the strikers by placing 
a black ban on all coal to the Port Hardy. 
This was the very development McCormack was awaiting. Subsequently 
he claimed that as the railwaymen had refused "to carry out the 
[Railway] Commissioner's instruction to deliver the coal to the Bowen 
jetty", the position represented "a direct challenge to constituted 
authority and the Government is reluctantly compelled to take the 
9 
necessary steps to see that its authority is not undermined". As 
might be expected, the rural and metropolitan press revelled in the 
prospect of a looming confrontation. The North Queensland Register 
argued: 
The general strike of railwaymen a couple of months ago, 
was a very different matter to that which the Seamens' 
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Strike Committee, headed by a noted extremist in Mr. Rhymer, 
is endeavouring to force on the Railwaymen...."Rhymer and 
Co." are apparently much more desirous of winning a 
reputation for desperate leadership, than they are anxious 
for the real welfare of the Railwaymen.1" 
The conservative Brisbane Courier also took up the issue, taunting 
McCormack to make good his earlier promise to take a firm stand 
against the militants: 
Have we reached the position of control on the railways 
when every man In the service can do as he wishes so 
long as it is not against the order of Boss Rymer?....Mr. 
Rymer says in effect this is so. The next move now lies 
with the Premier. This is the acid test. Mere professions 
are useless; the time has come for action.H 
Even one Labor journal, the Daily Standard, blazed with double-column 
headlines: "Bowen Dispute. Mr. Rymer to Blame, says Premier McCormack." 
Rymer lost little time publicly defending the ARU's actions. Not 
only was the decision to black ban coal to the Port Hardy a joint one 
by the Transport Unions Strike Committee, but. he declared, "the 
committee has all along authorised the supply of sufficient coal to 
overseas ships in order to prevent the primary products on board from 
rotting - without any influence from Mr. McCormack. because to 
allow it to do so would not assist the overseas men in the fight against 
13 the ship owners for reducing their wages". Further he hinted that 
his union was reconsidering its position: 
Mr. McCormack wants a brawl with the railwaymen in order 
to wipe out the victory obtained by them by the res-
toration of the 5/- per week, also the introduction 
of the 44 hour week in this state, both of which were 
accomplished against the bitter opposition of Mr. McCormack. 
but Railwaymen are too wide awake to allow him to embroil 
them in a general strike for the purpose of allowing him 
to play the role of the strong man.^^ 
During the following days the unions stood firm despite pressure 
from a "lawless element" in Bowen. While the majority of farmers 
aired their grievances at noisy street and waterfront demonstrations, 
it appeared that those "who had come in. some 200 strong, from the 
Burdekin, had the place more or less In terror, first pulling 
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individuals from their boarding house...going all over certain hotels, 
ransacking the premises". Then on 3 November, as a result of a 
directive from the Strike Committee, railwaymen delivered 70 tons of 
coal to the Port Hardy for refrigerating purposes. At midnight that 
same night, after loading the coal, the Port Hardy slipped from the 
coal wharf across to the jetty where farmers immediately commenced 
loading sugar into its hold. By 5 November 1200 tons of sugar had 
been loaded. In response, railway engine drivers refused to obey 
departmental instructions to bring down extra trucks of coal. The 
Port Hardy moved at noon to be coaled in the outer harbour by the 
Port Curtis, and subsequently sailed from Bowen. It is unclear who 
authorised the loading of sugar on the Port Hardy; however the 
vessel and its cargo came under the jurisdiction of the local Harbour 
Board. 
It was at this point that McCormack played his trump card. An-
ticipating retaliatory action by the ARU, he suspended thirteen 
railwaymen for refusing to handle the stockpiled coal. He 
justified his action on the grounds that the Government had no 
alternative, and that "the railwaymen must decide that they were not 
prepared to allow themselves to be dictated to by a body, which set 
18 itself up above a government authority". McCormack's manoeuvre left 
the ARU with two options: either back down or face a "full scale 
19 lockout for which it had made no preparations". A stopwork meeting 
of Bowen railwaymen was held on 6 November and it was finally decided 
that in the event of suspended employees not being reinstated within 
48 hours the branch line between Merlnda and Proserpine (used 
primarily to convey beef from the Merlnda meatworks) be declared 
20 
'black'- This restriction effectively tied the hands of ARU 
officials: if they Ignored the Bowen meeting's sentiments, they would 
alienate many members; if they supported the black ban they would 
be in a very weak position to pursue the dispute. When the State 
Strike Council met. the Australian Federated Union of Locomotive 
Enginemen submitted a motion to instruct the Bowen men to withdraw 
their ban as a preliminary to the Premier being requested to withdraw 
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the suspensions. But the ARU delegates successfully amended the 
resolution "to interview the Premier first and to request the with-
drawal of the suspensions on condition that the Bowen men withdrew 
their threat". 
When the delegation met with McCormack, he intimated his prepared-
ness to lift the suspensions, provided the unions gave an assurance 
that their members would in future carry out the instructions of the 
Railway Commissioner. At a subsequent meeting of the State Railway 
Strike Council it was decided after lengthy discussions that McCormack's 
demands could not be acceded to unequivocally. However the Council 
unanimously resolved to "instruct the railwajrmen at Bowen to cancel 
the threat of declaring sections of the Northern Railway Line black 
on the promise of the Premier that the employees suspended be Immediately 
21 
reinstated without any victimisation". McCormack refused to accept 
the Strike Council's resolution and threatened to fight the railwaymen 
by sending men from the 'South' to take their place. 
McCormack subsequently called a compulsory conference of union 
leaders at which certain suggestions for a settlement of the dispute 
were offered, without success. As he told Parliament: 
I told them that they were not going to be permitted 
to hamstring the whole railway service of Queensland 
by declaring certain sections "black". I told them 
they had to meet this issue. If that was their opinion 
and that was the stand they were going to take up, 
then the railways would not work until I got a decision 
on this Issue.22 
And as was later revealed: 
[A]fter discussion, the Premier suggested an amendment 
which though not acceptable to the Australian Railways 
Union representatives was accepted by the majority of 
the delegates at the conference, thus overruling the 
Australian Railways Union delegates.^3 
McCormack agreed to waive the suspensions on condition that railwaymen 
carry out future Instructions of the Railway Commissioner. The ARU 
delegates agreed that its members would abide by the Commissioner's 
orders "provided that such Instructions [did] not conflict with the 
9/ 
recognised principle of unionism and the Labor Movement". Soon 
afterwards the men went back to work, obviously on instructions from 
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the ARU officials, who could "ill-afford to lose the advantages" 
25 gained from the August railway strike. 
The Bowen dispute was successfully resolved when the Seamens' 
Union entered negotiations, and watersiders resumed work at Bowen on 
7 November 1925 under award conditions pending an enquiry to be held 
by the Arbitration Court into the rotary system. Commenting on 
the episode, Rymer declared that "the railwaymen have merely done 
what Mr. McCormack and Mr. Theodore taught many of them to do - that 
is, to be unionists. Had they refused to scab for any other employer 
27 than the government they would have been applauded by the politicians". 
In Rymer's view the undertaking meant that unionists ''must scab if 
28 
requested to do so". 
While the Worker, mouthpiece for the AWU, understandably applauded 
29 
McCormack's "Strong Stand" against the strikers, his prompt action In 
dealing with the militants also earned him the praise of the anti-
labor press: 
In Mr. McCormack he [Rjrmer] seems to have a Premier who 
cannot be so easily swayed by bluff and bluster....Quite 
apart from the political issues or party politics, the 
Premier can rest assured that if he maintains the 
authority of his Government, he will have the full weight 
of the community behind him. But there must be no more 
temporizing, no more Gillies bargaining.30 
McCormack understandably had angered the militant unions, and 
according to Rymer, the Trades and Labor Council "recognised in Premier 
McCormack's actions in the shipping and railway troubles yet another 
would-be strong man prepared to respond to the urglngs of the Tory 
31 Press to deal out law and order". There was substance in his claim 
as the Brisbane TLC not only made history by refusing to congratulate 
McCormack on his accession to office, but also resolved at their 
November meeting: 
That in view of the anti-working class attitude adopted 
by Premier McCormack in the present shipping strike, his 
open preference towards scab labour in the matter of police 
and other protection, this Trades and Labour Council 
repudiates Mr. McCormack and considers he is not a fit 
and proper person to continue in office, and that the 
resolution be conveyed to the Premier by deputation.^•^ 
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Furthermore it urged that "Caucus investigate the actions of the 
Premier for the purpose of endln; 
McCormack in the shipping strike 
ing the dictatorship set up by Premier 
,. 33 
Clearly McCormack had planned to Isolate the ARU. and his tactics 
proved largely successful. For its part, the ARU had alienated the 
railway craft unions during the Bowen dispute. Despite Rymer's 
insistence that "the Port Hardy was finally coaled by a scab ship 
34 
out in the harbour, and not by scab railwaymen", and despite ARU 
branch support for their President, craft union officials considered 
the ARU had "backed down in principle when McCormack pressed the 
35 issue". However, McCormack's victory over the ARU leadership was 
a hollow one and was soured by the result in the northern electorate 
of Herbert in the 1925 general election. Here his long-standing 
friend and colleague, E.G. Theodore, had been favoured to win the 
seat and enter Federal politics. But following a campaign fought 
mainly on State Industrial issues. Theodore was defeated at the polls 
by 268 votes: "the high informal vote [2188] clearly demonstrated 
that many trade unionists had followed Rymer's advice to abstain or 
36 
vote Informal as Labour had betrayed the trade union movement". 
McCormack subsequently hit back at the ARU leaders by invoking the 
anti-Communist pledge which was aimed at a number of trade union 
officials with alleged communist sympathies, among them George Rymer. 
Their expulsion first from the Queensland Central Executive of the 
37 ALP and then from the 1926 Southport labor-in-polltics Convention 
was deliberately engineered; this indirectly bolstered the Influence 
of the AWU in labor politics. 
For Rymer and the ARU the outcome was little short of a disaster. 
They had set out to consolidate the success they had won in the week-
long railway strike during the Port Hardy dispute, but they had badly 
misjudged the complex situation and were forced into a humiliating 
public withdrawal. Moreover they were now denied representation at 
both administrative and policy making levels of the ALP. and their 
expulsion seriously impinged upon the ARU's immediate Influence not 
only within the Labor Party but also within the trade union movement. 
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In the light of later developments McCormack's actions in isolating 
the ARU were most unwise. Had he relented and agreed to bury the 
hatchet, by sheer weight of numbers he could have exerted his 
authority. Instead of alienating the railway union with his 'strong 
man' tactics he should have endeavoured to reconcile the Labour 
movement in general. As it was, McCormack not only earned the 
undying hatred of Rjrmer and the ARU, but caused considerable dis-
quiet among moderate unionists, illustrated by the loss of Herbert 
in the 1925 election. Having been rendered the political leper of 
the Labour movement, the ARU was left with but one recourse - further 
Industrial action. The bitter personal feud between McCormack and 
Rymer which emerged publicly during the Port Hardy dispute at Bowen 
was to prove critical to the course of industrial relations in the 
late 1920's and ultimately to the defeat of the Labour government in 
1929. 
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